Polarization and International Politics: How Extreme Partisanship Threatens Global Stability
Forthcoming at Princeton University Press (Studies in International History & Politics)
Polarization is a defining feature of politics in the United States and many other democracies. Yet although there is much research focusing on the effects of polarization on domestic politics, little is known about how polarization influences international cooperation and conflict. Democracies are thought to have advantages over nondemocratic nations in international relations, including the ability to keep foreign policy stable across time, credibly signal information to adversaries, and maintain commitments to allies. Does domestic polarization affect these “democratic advantages”? In this timely book, Rachel Myrick argues that polarization reshapes the nature of constraints on democratic leaders, which in turn erodes the advantages democracies have in foreign affairs.
Drawing on a range of evidence, including cross-national analyses, observational and experimental public opinion research, descriptive data on the behavior of politicians, and interviews with policymakers, Myrick develops metrics that explain the effect of extreme polarization on international politics and traces the pathways by which polarization undermines each of the democratic advantages. Turning to the case of contemporary US foreign policy, Myrick shows that as its political leaders become less responsive to the public and less accountable to political opposition, the United States loses both reliability as an ally and credibility as an adversary. Myrick’s account links the effects of polarization on democratic governance to theories of international relations, integrating work across the fields of international relations, comparative politics, and American politics to explore how patterns of domestic polarization shape the international system.
Publications
DOMESTIC POLARIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL RIVALRY: HOW ADVERSARIES RESPOND TO AMERICA'S PARTISAN POLITICS
(co-authored with Chen Wang)
How do foreign rivals perceive and respond to heightened domestic polarization in the United States? The conventional thinking is that polarization weakens and distracts the United States, emboldening its adversaries. However, untested assumptions underlie this claim. We use two strategies to explore mechanisms linking domestic polarization and international rivalry. First, we field a survey experiment in China to examine how heightening perceptions of US polarization affects public attitudes toward Chinese foreign policy. Second, we investigate how US rival governments responded to an episode of extreme partisanship: the US Capitol attacks on January 6, 2021. Drawing on Integrated Crisis Early Warning System event data, we explore whether foreign rivals increased hostility toward the United States following the Capitol riots. Both studies fail to show robust evidence for the Emboldening Hypothesis. Extreme polarization has other negative consequences for American foreign policy, but we find no evidence that it makes adversaries materially more assertive toward the United States.
STATUS: Published at The Journal of Politics. Paper available HERE. PDF available HERE.
PRESENTED AT: 2022 American Political Science Association Conference in Montreal, CA.
EVIDENCE-BASED TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: INCORPORATING PUBLIC OPINION INTO THE FIELD, WITH NEW DATA FROM IRAQ AND UKRAINE
(co-authored with Mara Revkin and Ala' Alrababa'h)
The field of “transitional justice” refers to a range of processes and mechanisms for accountability, truth-seeking, and reconciliation that governments and communities pursue in the aftermath of major societal traumas including civil war, mass atrocities, and authoritarianism. This relatively new field emerged in the 1980s as scholars, practitioners, and policymakers looked for guidance to support post-authoritarian and post-communist transitions to democracy in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Since then, the field has grown rapidly—so rapidly that it is outpacing its capacity to learn from past mistakes. Recent methodological advances in the study of public attitudes about transitional justice through quantitative surveys and qualitative interview methods provide unprecedented insights into how different mechanisms including domestic and international prosecutions, truth commissions, amnesty laws, and compensation are perceived by their intended beneficiaries. The results have been troubling. Numerous studies in diverse contexts found that some of the most well-known transitional-justice mechanisms, including those employed in South Africa, Rwanda, and Cambodia, failed to achieve their objectives of peacebuilding and reconciliation. In some cases, these policies had harmful consequences for their intended beneficiaries, including retraumatization and perceived “justice gaps” between victims’ preferred remedies and their actual outcomes. There is an urgent need for the field of transitional justice to learn from this growing body of empirical research to develop evidence-based policies and programs that achieve their intended objectives. This Feature critically reviews the intellectual development of the field, consolidating empirical findings of relevant studies across disciplines—law, political science, sociology, economics, public health, psychology, and anthropology—and identifying open debates and questions for future research. We focus on research about public attitudes toward transitional justice in the communities directly impacted by conflict. In addition to reviewing previous research, we present new data from original public opinion surveys in Iraq and Ukraine relevant to ongoing transitional-justice efforts in those countries. We use this evidence to identify lessons learned, including mistakes, in the design and implementation of previous transitional-justice processes. We conclude by discussing the normative and prescriptive implications of our findings for efforts to improve future transitional-justice laws and policies.
STATUS: Published at Yale Law Journal. Paper available HERE.
PUBLIC REACTIONS TO SECRET NEGOTIATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
Many international agreements, ranging from routine trade deals to high-stakes nuclear agreements, are negotiated in secret. However, we have a limited understanding of how the secrecy of a negotiation shapes public attitudes towards the final agreement. In a survey experiment, I first examine overall attitudes towards secrecy in international security and economic agreements to evaluate whether or not respondents criticize the U.S. government for negotiating agreements in secret. I then randomize different justifications the government uses for engaging in secret negotiations--improved success, protection of sensitive information, and anticipation of criticism from domestic and international opponents--to explore which arguments legitimize a lack of transparency in international politics. I find that, on average, respondents are averse to secrecy in international negotiations, but there are conditions under which they perceive it as more or less permissible. Respondents are more likely to view secrecy as justified when negotiations contain sensitive information or secrecy improves the probability that an agreement will be reached. By contrast, respondents least approve of secrecy when the government negotiates out of public view in order to avoid domestic criticism.
STATUS: Published at The Journal of Conflict Resolution. Paper available HERE. PDF available HERE.
PRESENTED AT: 2022 International Studies Association Conference in Nashville, Tennessee.
THE REPUTATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF POLARIZATION FOR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
How does partisan polarization in the United States affect foreign perceptions of U.S. security commitments and global leadership? Using a survey experiment fielded to 2000 British adults, I demonstrate that priming respondents to think about U.S. polarization negatively impacts their evaluations of the U.S.-U.K. bilateral relationship and U.S. foreign policy. These impacts are stronger for the long-term, reputational consequences of polarization than for immediate security concerns. In other words, while foreign allies may not necessarily believe a polarized America will renege on existing security commitments, perceptions of extreme polarization make other countries less willing to engage in future partnerships with the United States and more skeptical of its global leadership in the long run. I further demonstrate that the negative reputational consequences of polarization are driven by perceptions of preference-based, ideological polarization rather than identity-based, affective polarization. I argue that these results suggest that American allies anticipate that increasing divergence between the Republican and Democratic Party creates uncertainty around U.S. foreign policy in the future.
STATUS: Published at International Politics. Special issue on "Polarization and US Foreign Policy." Paper available HERE. PDF available HERE.
PRESENTED AT: 2019 International Studies Association Conference in Toronto, CA and 2020 Workshop on "Domestic Polarization and US Foreign Policy" at University of Heidelberg.
MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS DIPLOMACY: EVIDENCE FROM A US CAMPAIGN TO FREE POLITICAL PRISONERS
(co-authored with Jeremy Weinstein)
Scholarship on human rights diplomacy (HRD)—efforts by government officials to engage publicly and privately with their foreign counterparts—often focuses on actions taken to “name and shame” target countries because private diplomatic activities are unobservable. To understand how HRD works in practice, we explore a campaign coordinated by the US government to free twenty female political prisoners. We compare release rates of the featured women to two comparable groups: a longer list of women considered by the State Department for the campaign; and other women imprisoned simultaneously in countries targeted by the campaign. Both approaches suggest that the campaign was highly effective. We consider two possible mechanisms through which expressive public HRD works: by imposing reputational costs and by mobilizing foreign actors. However, in-depth interviews with US officials and an analysis of media coverage find little evidence of these mechanisms. Instead, we argue that public pressure resolved deadlock within the foreign policy bureaucracy, enabling private diplomacy and specific inducements to secure the release of political prisoners. Entrepreneurial bureaucrats leveraged the spotlight on human rights abuses to overcome competing equities that prevent government-led coercive diplomacy on these issues. Our research highlights the importance of understanding the intersection of public and private diplomacy before drawing inferences about the effectiveness of HRD.
STATUS: Published at International Organization. Paper available HERE. PDF available HERE.
PRESENTED AT: 2018 Journeys in World Politics Workshop at University of Iowa, 2018 Annotation for Transparent Inquiry Workshop in New York, NY.
TOWARDS A UNIFIED APPROACH TO RESEARCH ON DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING
(co-authored with Haemin Jee and Hans Lueders)
A growing literature examines democratic backsliding, but there is little consensus on when, where, and why it occurs. Reviewing more than 100 recent articles and working papers, this research note argues that inattention to the measurement of backsliding and the underlying concept of democracy drives this disagreement. We propose three remedies. First, we outline several questions that help researchers navigate common measurement challenges. Second, we argue that conceptual confusion around backsliding is driven in large part by inconsistent definitions of democracy. We show how outlining a comprehensive concept of democracy enables researchers to better account for the diversity of instances of democratic backsliding. Our third contribution is drawing attention to a previously overlooked form of backsliding: when governments lose the effective power to govern or voters and elites increasingly disagree about truths and facts. The research note urges scholars to pay closer attention to the conceptualization and measurement of backsliding prior to empirical analysis.
STATUS: Published at Democratization. Paper available HERE. PDF available HERE.
PRESENTED AT: 2018 Midwest Political Science Association Conference in Chicago, IL
DO EXTERNAL THREATS UNITE OR DIVIDE?
A common explanation for the increasing polarization in contemporary American foreign policy is the absence of external threat. I identify two mechanisms through which threats could reduce polarization: by revealing information about an adversary that elicits a bipartisan response from policymakers (information mechanism) and by heightening the salience of national relative to partisan identity (identity mechanism).To evaluate the information mechanism, Study 1 uses computational text analysis of congressional speeches to explore whether security threats reduce partisanship in attitudes toward foreign adversaries. To evaluate the identity mechanism, Study 2 uses public opinion polls to assess whether threats reduce affective polarization among the public.Study 3 tests both mechanisms in a survey experiment that heightens a security threat from China. I find that the external threat hypothesis has limited ability to explain either polarization in US foreign policy or affective polarization among the American public.Instead, responses to external threats reflect the domestic political environment in which they are introduced. The findings cast doubt on predictions that new foreign threats will inherently create partisan unity.
STATUS: Published at International Organization. Paper available HERE. PDF available HERE.
PRESENTED AT: 2019 American Political Science Association Conference in Washington, D.C, 2019 Peace Science Society Annual Meeting, and 2020 International Studies Association Conference (cancelled). Received the Stuart A. Bremer Award for the 2019 Peace Science Society Annual Meeting. Received the 2021 Best Graduate Paper in Foreign Policy Award from the American Political Science Association for a paper presented at the 2019 or 2020 APSA Conference. Honorable mention for the 2021 Patricia Weitsman Award from the International Studies Association for a paper submitted to the 2020 ISA Conference.
WHY SO SECRETIVE? ATTITUDES TOWARDS SECRECY AND SUCCESS IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
To what extent does transparency in foreign policymaking matter to democratic publics? Scholars and policymakers have posited a normative commitment to transparency in the conduct of foreign affairs, an assumption baked into many existing models of international politics. This paper tests the existence of a “transparency norm” in international security using two original survey experiments about covert action. The first experiment recovers attitudes towards a covert operation by holding the circumstances, cost, and outcomes of a conflict constant and manipulating whether foreign involvement was public or kept secret. The second experiment unpacks an “ends” and “means” trade-off by exploring whether there are conditions under which covert action is unacceptable to the public, regardless of policy outcomes. The findings demonstrate that democratic publics have only a weak preference for transparency: citizens care substantially more about the outcomes of U.S. foreign policy rather than the process by which the policy was created.
STATUS: Published at The Journal of Politics. Paper available HERE. PDF available HERE.
PRESENTED AT: 2018 International Studies Association Conference in San Francisco, CA. Received the 2018 Alexander George Award from the International Studies Association, Foreign Policy Analysis Section. Runner-up for the 2020 Best Research Article Prize in US Foreign Policy & Grand Strategy from the America in the World Consortium (AWC).
DO DONOR MOTIVES MATTER? INVESTIGATING PERCEPTIONS OF FOREIGN AID IN THE CONFLICT IN DONBAS
(co-authored with Ala' Alrababa'h and Isaac Webb)
How do the perceived motives of donor states shape recipient attitudes towards foreign aid in a conflict zone? We identify two frames that characterize the motives of foreign powers involved in an ongoing civil conflict in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. These frames portray foreign actors as either providing aid to alleviate suffering during conflict (humanitarian frame) or to increase their power and influence in the recipient country (political influence frame). In a survey experiment conducted throughout Ukraine, we demonstrate how these frames impact attitudes towards foreign assistance from the European Union and the Russian government. We show that both frames increase support for foreign aid from the European Union but have no influence on views of Russian aid. Counter to conventional expectations, we demonstrate that aid provided for geopolitical, strategic reasons can at times be viewed as a positive, stabilizing force---even more than foreign aid provided for humanitarian reasons.
STATUS: Published at International Studies Quarterly. Paper available HERE. PDF available HERE.
PRESENTED AT: 2017 American Political Science Association Conference in San Francisco, CA
CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS AND CIVIL WAR ONSET
(co-authored with Lindsey Reid, Kelly Kadera, and Mark Crescenzi)
The spread of civil war poses serious risks and costs. We argue that conflict environments, which vary across time and space, can systematically exacerbate the spread of civil war. As conflict in a state’s neighborhood becomes more spatially proximate and as lingering effects of conflict accumulate over time, that state’s risk of civil war onset increases. To theorize and test this argument, we construct the Conflict Environment (CE) score, a concept that taps into spatial and temporal dimensions of violence in a state’s neighborhood. Using the CE score in established empirical models of civil war onset, we demonstrate that a dangerous conflict environment consistently elevates the risk of civil war, outperforming traditional measures of nearby violence, even when domestic factors are taken into account.
STATUS: Published at The Journal of Global Security Studies. Paper available HERE. PDF available HERE.
Working Papers & Projects
TODAY UKRAINE, TOMORROW TAIWAN? ASSESSING TRANSFERABILITY OF U.S. REPUTATION FOR RESOLVE ACROSS INTERNATIONAL CRISES
(co-authored with Chen Wang)
When does a state’s reputation for resolve transfer across international crises? We propose three assumptions underlying "Transferability of Reputation." First, a defender’s response to a crisis leads a new challenger to reassess the defender's reputation (reputation formation). Second, the new challenger sees the crisis as comparable to a future crisis (situational comparability). Third, anticipating the defender's response, the challenger changes its preferences (adversary-oriented decision-making). We test the theory by examining whether the initial U.S. response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine impacted Chinese assertiveness toward Taiwan. A framing experiment in China in March 2022 finds that a weak U.S. response to Russian aggression decreases the U.S.’s general reputation for resolve. However, it neither substantially shapes expectations about how the U.S. would respond to a Taiwan crisis nor changes Chinese attitudes toward Taiwan. Our results demonstrate limitations of transferability of reputation arguments, which are sometimes invoked to justify force in foreign affairs.
STATUS: Invited to Revise & Resubmit
THE REPUTATIONAL IMPACTS OF FOREIGN POLICY FAILURES: EVIDENCE FROM THE US WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN
(co-authored with Will Marble)
Do perceived foreign policy failures shape assessments of a country’s reputation in the eyes of international observers? We explore the reputational consequences of foreign policy failures using global reactions to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Some argue that the chaotic withdrawal heightened concerns about US global leadership and increased the attractiveness of its adversaries. Others believe that the reputational consequences of the withdrawal were exaggerated. To adjudicate between these claims, we compile public opinion surveys across 24 countries containing over 17,000 respondents. Analyzing perceptions of US leadership before and after the fall of Kabul on August 15, 2021, we find that the Afghanistan withdrawal had a substantive negative impact on global perceptions of US leadership. However, we observe no corresponding evidence that reputation is “zero-sum”: the negative reputational consequences for the US were not paralleled by an increase in public approval of alternatives to US leadership like Russia and China.
STATUS: Under Review
PERMISSION TO SECEDE? THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN ENDORSEMENTS ON ATTITUDES TOWARD SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS
(co-authored with Stephanie Wright and Ala Alrababah)
How do international endorsements of separatist movements by foreign powers impact popular views toward secession? Much literature on secessionist movements focuses on subnational bargaining between the government and separatist groups. However, these models often neglect international audiences, who offer recognition and other forms of external support for separatist groups. This paper demonstrates that when foreign powers take positions on secessionist activities, these actions can affect popular support for such movements in both the parent state and the separatist areas. In a survey experiment in Ukraine examining attitudes toward the Russian-backed separatist movement, we randomize hypothetical scenarios in which foreign powers endorse secession and measure changes in public attitudes in both the parent state and the territory under separatist control. Our results show that even in conflict-affected settings where attitudes have presumably hardened, international endorsements can increase popular support for secessionist movements.
STATUS: Under Review
DO LEADERS, PARTIES, OR POLICIES SHAPE EVALUATIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY? EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM THE 2024 US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
In the summer of 2024, during a tumultuous presidential election season in the United States, incumbent president Joe Biden was replaced by his Vice President Kamala Harris as the Democratic nominee. The sudden replacement of the presidential nominee provides a real-world opportunity to revisit existing debates about leaders in international relations. Across two waves of a large public opinion survey about US foreign affairs conducted in summer 2024 (n = 8600), I compare respondents’ evaluations of the Democratic candidates. The results emphasize two main findings. First, party cues tend to trump leader cues among a domestic audience. Unsurprisingly, respondents exhibit strong partisan biases towards in-party candidates and are wary of out-party candidates judgments. But these attitudes do not differ substantially when the candidate is Biden or Harris. Second, in contrast with findings about a “gendered peace premium,” Harris does not appear to receive any penalties in assessments of her performance in international crises or negotiations. If anything, the opposite is true: Harris performs slightly better among Democrats than Biden in terms of assessments of strength and competence in hypothetical foreign policy scenarios.
STATUS: In Progress